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ARTICLE V: CHANGING DIMENSIONS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
Francis H. Heller*
To anyone raised under the Constitution of the United States,
that document's declaration that it is "the supreme law of the
land" 1 may appear as a commonplace assertion. In some other
nations the constitution is not viewed as law, but is seen as a
primarily political document. 2 In fact, some foreign constitutions
are formally proclaimed to be "political constitutions."-3 The
writers of the American Constitution were well aware that they
were engaged in fashioning an arrangement for the exercise of
political functions and the peaceful adjustment of political
conflict. 4 And, however much validity there continues to be to de
Tocqueville's famous dictum that in America every issue of policy
is translated into constitutional terms and debated as a legal
issue,5 it is also a historical fact that, by long-standing precedent
of the Supreme Court, some issues arising under the Constitution
are candidly designated "political questions,"63 while others are
often avoided by the selective application of judicially developed
rules of caution.
7
A constitution, viewed as a political document, is a framework
* Roy A. Roberts Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Kansas School
of Law. M.A.. 1941, J.D., 1941, Ph.D., 1948. University of Virginia.
'U.S. CONST. art. VI.
2C. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY, ch. 9 (4th ed.
1968).3 See, e.g., POLITICAL CONST. OF COLUMBIA, Preamble (1886). See also CON-
STITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (A. Blaustein & G. Flantz eds. 1971), a
comprehensive loose-leaf collection of current constitutional texts.
4
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, passin (rev. ed. M. Farrand
1937); Roche, The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action, 55 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 799, 815 (1961), also in J. ROCHE, SHADOW AND SUBSTANCE 91- 126 (1964).
5 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 284 (H. Reeve transl. 1898). Note
also Corwin's observation that '[mlany other countries have ... constitutions, but 'the
constitutional lawyer' is a unique product of our system .. " E. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT
OF THE SUPREME COURT XXii (1934).
6 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186. 210-27 (1962); Luther v. Borden. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1
(1849). Scharpf. Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75
YALE L.J. 517 (1966).
7
Ashwander v. TVA. 297 U.S. 288. 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.. concurring). A.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 119-27 (1962); Corwin. Judicial Review in
Action, 74 U. PA. L. REV. 639. 642-51 (1926).
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for the exercise of power in the polity. Legal rules, by contrast,
purport to determine the broad range of societal relationships.,
When a constitution is treated as just another form of law, there
results an ambiguity of thought that tends to overshadow signifi-
cant functional differences.
What is properly a subject for inclusion in a constitution? Even
the most superficial perusal of the Index Digest of State Con-
stitutions9 reveals a bewildering array of topics, from Advertising
to Zoning, which one would find difficult to characterize as
directly related to the exercise of governmental powers. Many of
these topics have come to be included as constitutional provisions
because the process of constitutional change in the respective
states made it relatively easy to clothe what would otherwise be
statutory matters with the aura of constitutional dignity. Some
state constitutions are clearly too easy to amend; 10 elsewhere, the
process is so resistant to change that recourse has been sought in
the federal courts. 1'
How easy (or how difficult) should it be to amend a con-
stitution? John Locke, in the fashion of his time, proclaimed that
the "fundamental laws" he had drafted for the government of
Carolina should "be and remain the sacred and unalterable form
and rule of government ... forever.' 1 2 William Penn, by contrast,
had observed in the preface to his Frame of Government of
Pennsylvania that he did not "find a model in the world, that time,
place, and some singular emergences have not necessarily al-
tered" and then proceeded to provide a method of amendment by
a qualified majority.' 3 But Penn acknowledged differences even
within a frame of government. The Charter of Privileges which he
approved in 1701 declares that
because the Happiness of Mankind depends so much upon
the Enjoying of Liberty of their Consciences ... I do hereby
solemnly declare, promise and grant, for me, my Heirs and
Assigns, That the first Article of this Charter relating to
8 See generally'v H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) and J. STONE, THE PROVINCE
AND FUNCTION OF LAW (1946).
9 INDEX DIGEST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS(2d ed. R. Edwards 1959).
10 Prior to 197 1. California had amended its constitution 375 times: South Carolina, 398
times; Louisiana. 496 times: and Georgia. 691 times. 19 BOOK OF THE STATES 1972-73. at
21 (1972).
11 See Reynolds v. Sims. 377 U.S. 533 (1964): Baker v. Carr. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
12 1 Z. CHAFEE, DOCUMENTS ON FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS 146. 153 (paperback
ed. 1963); Cahn, An American Contribution, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW I, 6
(E. Cahn ed. 1954).
13 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS. COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 1518-20 (2d ed. B. Poore 1878). quoted by
Cahn. supra note 12. at 9-10.
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Liberty of Conscience, and every Part and Clause therein,
according to the true Intent and Meaning thereof, shall be
kept and remain, without an Alteration, inviolably for ever.
14
Liberty of conscience was to be permanently enshrined because it
was essential to "the happiness of mankind." Natural law prin-
ciples were widely accepted in the decades preceding the Ameri-
can Declaration of Independence. 1 5 Since the principles were
considered to be immutable (and "inalienable"), the written con-
stitution which embodied them-or to the extent that it embodied
them-also acquired the character of immutability. 16 Thus the
language of the Articles of Confederation ("and Perpetual
Union") was entirely in keeping with the spirit of the times in its
assumptions that nothing in the Articles would need change, and
that certainly nothing should be changed except by unanimous
consent of all the member states.1
7
A number of the framers apparently maintained the view that
there was no need to provide machinery for constitutional change.
The Virginia Plan had called for the inclusion of an amendment
provision in the new instrument of governance, but, when the
matter came up in the Committee of the Whole, a majority voted
to postpone its consideration.' 8 When the matter was brought up
again, "several members," so James Madison recorded, "did not
see the necessity of the resolution at all."' 9 But George Mason,
supported by Edmund Randolph, reminded the delegates that they
were in Philadelphia precisely because the Articles of Con-
federation had been found wanting and it stood to reason that the
new document would also have defects. "Amendments, therefore,
will be necessary; and it will be better to provide for them in an
easy, regular and constitutional way than to trust to chance and
violence." 20 The argument must have been persuasive: there were
no negative votes as the proposition to provide for orderly amend-
141 Z. CHAFEE. supra note 12. at 166.
15 R. POUND, THE FORMATIVE PERIOD OF AMERICAN LAW, ch. 1 (1938); Cohen, A
Critical Sketch of Legal Philosophy in America, in 2 LAW: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 266,
269-80 (A. Reppy ed. 1937).16 Cahn, supra note 12. at 8.
17 NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,
THE FORMATION OF THE UNION 37 (1970).
18 A. PRESCOTT, DRAFTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 685-86 (1941). This is a most
convenient rearrangement by topics of Madison's notes. The most comprehensive docu-
mentation of the proceedings of the Philadelphia Convention is THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (rev. ed. M. Farrand 1937): Scheips. The Significance
and Adoption ofArticle V of the Constitution, 26 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 46 (1950).
19 A. PRESCOTT. supra note 18. at 685.
20 Id. at 686.
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ment was approved, first in the Committee of the Whole and then
by the Convention.
21
The debate that followed the report of the Committee on Detail
is significant because, if one believes Madison's notes, the Con-
vention never returned to the issue of immutability versus flex-
ibility. The focus was entirely on the role the states should play in
future changes of the Constitution. The proviso accepting equal
representation in the Senate was added to quiet the fears of the
small states, as was the alternative method for proposing amend-
ments by the states through a convention. 22 The late Professor
Edmond Cahn speculated that
the statesmen of 1787 would be astonished to learn that at
this remote date the Constitution remains in force at all....
Could we consult them today, I think the framers would
inquire why we have not exercised the power of amendment
more frequently and more extensively. 2
3
Indeed, one recent author has described the formal amendment
process as "comatose." '24 One would assume that the adjective is
used in a very loose sense; the definition of "coma" is "a state of
deep unconsciousness caused by disease, injury, or poison."
25
While one may validly assert that article V has not been over-
worked, it is arguable whether this relative inaction can be attrib-
uted to factors so deleterious as to be compared to "disease,
injury, or poison."
How inactive the amending process has been, can perhaps
















23 Cahn, supra note 12, at 10- 11; Bates, Foreword to L. ORFIELD, THE AMENDING OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION at vii-viii (1942).
24 Dixon, Article V: The Comatose Article of our Living Constitution, 66 MICH. L. REV.
931 (1968).
25 THE NEW MERRIAM-WEBSTER POCKET DICTIONARY 97 (1971).
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If one accepts the propositions that the first ten amendments
are really part of the initial constitution-writing effort and amend-
ments eleven and twelve correct technical deficiencies of the
original document,26 then this tabular presentation suggests not
that the amendment process is dormant (perhaps a better word
than comatose), but that it appears to have shown more life in the
last twenty-five years than at any other time in the nation's his-
tory.
It must also be asked whether this numerical showing reflects
qualitative significance. Have the really important changes been
accomplished by the article V amendment process or have they
come about by judicial review? It would be idle to argue the
point: the landmark decisions of the Supreme Court have done
more to adapt the nation to change than has any amendment. 27
Is there, then, something in the amending process that saps it of
its potential vitality? Why have we not used it more extensively in
the past? As a corollary, why, in recent decades, has there been
so much interest in the convention method of constitutional
amendment?
If one compares the amending process in the United States
with provisions for constitutional change in other countries having
a federal system of government, 28 it is evident that the process in
the United States is more complex and potentially more time-
consuming than it is elsewhere. Indeed, ours is the only con-
stitution to involve the legislative bodies of the states constituting
the Union in this process. 2 9 In some otherwise ostensibly federal
26 Dixon, supra note 24. at 931-32.
27 A SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 203 (1965) Kauper. The Alterna-
tive Amendment Process: Some Observations, 66 MICH. L. REV. 903. 917 (1968).
28 McWhinney, Amendment of the Constitution, in STUDIES IN FEDERALISm 790- 815
(1954).See also W. LIVINGSTON. FEDERALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE( 1956).
29 McWhinney, supra note 28. at 792.
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constitutions (Austria, New Zealand, the Soviet Union, West
Germany), there is no provision involving the component units in
the amending process.
30
This comparison, however, also reveals that formal arrange-
ments that are very similar in kind may produce entirely different
results. Australia and Switzerland employ amending procedures
that are quite similar. The federal legislature proposes an amend-
ment which is then submitted to popular referendum; to become a
part of the constitution, the amendment must be approved by a
majority of all those voting, and also by a majority of those voting
in a majority of states (cantons in Switzerland). 31 In a comparable
fifty-year period (1901- 5 1), Australian voters approved only four
out of twenty-four submitted proposals, while the Swiss record
was twenty-six adopted out of thirty-one submitted. 32 Similarly,
the Mexican Constitution's amending provisions are almost iden-
tical to those of the United States; yet, the politcal dominance of
one party has produced results in Mexico that are starkly different
from those in this country.
33
What this detour into comparative government demonstrates is
that results cannot be related to form. If the formal amending
process has been used relatively infrequently in the United States,
the reason cannot be found in the nature of the process.
Nevertheless, the advocates urging the adoption of the Ameri-
can Constitution used the availability of an amending process as
an effective argument in the fight for ratification:
[W]hat a virtue [the framers] ... made of it! It became one of
the standard arguments in the campaign for ratification, a big
gun which was reserved for use after every other debating
weapon had failed to repel the opposition, then wheeled sys-
tematically into place, loaded with the ammunition of osten-
sible reasonableness, and discharged point-blank in the ad-
versary's face-to his discomfort at least, often to his devas-
tation. Does this or that provision in the draft seem unwise?
Does the gentleman persist in his objection? Very well, since
30W. LIVINGSTON, supra note 28, at 301. In the Federal Republic of Germany, how-
ever, the upper house (Bundesrat) consists of officials of the Lnder (state) governments,
so that state views are reflected in that portion of the federal legislative machinery.
31 AUSTRALIA CONST. ch. 8, § 128 (1901); SWITZERLAND CONST. arts. 118-23 (1874,
amended 1891).
32W. LIVINGSTON, supra note 28. at 118, 185-87. The figures for Switzerland do not
include proposals submitted by popular initiative. There were thirty-six such proposals, of
which six were adopted. In addition, seven propositions advanced as counter-proposals to
initiative proposals received the requisite number of votes. Altogether, therefore, the Swiss
Constitution was amended thirty-nine times in fifty years-or, roughly ten times as often as
the Australian Constitution.
3 3 
W. LIVINGSTON, supra note 28. at 303. See also R. SCOTT, MEXICAN GOVERNMENT
IN TRANSITION ch. 3 (1959).
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the times do not admit of delay, let us proceed to ratify in
haste, then we can go about amending at leisure.
3 4
And amend they did-no less than a dozen times in the first
fifteen years. Alexander Hamilton3 5 and his allies appeared to be
sound prognosticators. Then, for sixty-two years, nothing.
Was there no change for sixty-two years? Obviously, anyone
familiar with the history of the Constitution knows the answer. It
is embodied in McCulloch v. Maryland,3 6 Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward,3 7 Cohens v. Virginia,3 8 Gibbons v. Og-
den,39 to name but a few, none thinkable without Marbury v.
Madison 40
There is a brief passage in Marbury v. Madison that deserves
to be brought into this discussion. Here are Chief Justice Mar-
shall's words:
That the people have an original right to establish, for their
future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall
most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis, on which
the whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise of
this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor
ought it to be frequently repeated.
41
Certainly, the great Chief Justice did not accept Thomas Jef-
ferson's oft-quoted proposition that every generation needed to
establish its own claim to the fruits of liberty.4 2 Marshall's lan-
guage clearly implies that there should be a renewal of the con-
stituent act-just not too frequently. But, if one accepts Mar-
shall's dictum, how often would be too frequently?
There are numerous scholars who believe that the Civil War
wrought a transformation of American political life of major sig-
nificance, in that, for all practical purposes, it converted a con-
federacy into a true union.43 Under this view, the Civil War
34 Cahn, supra note 12, at 11.
35 THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 607 (H. Dawson ed. 1863).
36 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (prohibiting the states from taxing the Bank of the
United States).
37 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (barring the states from impairing contractual obliga-
tions by amending legislatively granted corporate charters).
38 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (sustaining the Court's appellate jurisdiction to review
state criminal proceedings).
3922 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (upholding the plenary power of the federal government
to regulate interstate commerce).
405 U.S. (0 Cranch) 137 (1803).
41 Id. at 176 (emphasis added).
42 "The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots &
tyrants, It is it's [sic] natural manure." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to W.S. Smith,
November 13, 1787, in 4 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 465, 467 (P. Ford ed.
1894).
43 E.g., A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGIN AND
DEVELOPMENT407 (4th ed. 1970).
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amendments to the Constitution were the formal manifestation of
this change. Thus, to borrow Marshall's phrase, the second "great
exertion" came roughly seventy years after the first one.
Another seventy years later, the nation again faced the question
of whether the Constitution was adequate to the needs of the
day.4 4 The crisis involved the Court's failure to sustain measures
designed to allow government regulation of private economic rela-
tionships. A first attempt to change the Constitution by the pro-
cess of formal amendment failed to produce timely results. 45 The
constitutional crisis of 193746 did not produce the violence of the
crisis of 1861, but one may well say that, constitutionally, it was a
"great exertion" indeed. The resolution, however, came by judi-
cial fiat rather than constitutional amendment.47
But suppose the "switch in time" 48 had not occurred? One
cannot speculate on either the time required or the bloodshed
engendered, but it stands to reason that the changes now reposing
in the pages of 301 U.S. (and later volumes) would have come
about constitutionally. Amendments twenty-two to twenty-six
might have dealt with social security, labor relations, minimum
wages, and agricultural adjustment.
Thus, in 1937, the Court saved the nation from the full force of
a "great exertion" of constitutional reform. But the incremental
nature of judicial review rarely has the impact, symbolic or other-
wise, of an actual constitutional enactment. In addition, in the
decades since the turn of the century, the almost unqualified
veneration of the Constitution that was so characteristic of the
late nineteenth century4 9 had given way to an increasing realiza-
tion of the role of judicial temperament, initiative and judgment. 50
Typical of this shift was the change in the personal perspective
of Charles Evans Hughes.
Charles Evans Hughes, who in earlier years had been made
to writhe by misuse of his statement torn out of context that
44 E. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT (1934); J. SMITH, STUDIES IN
THE ADEQUACY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1939).
4 The Child Labor Amendment had been proposed by Congress in 1924 (43 Stat. 670),
but failed to receive the necessary number of ratifications. See also Coleman v. Miller, 307
U.S. 433 (1939).
4 6
See J. ALSOP & T. CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS (1938); L. BAKER, BACK TO BACK:
THE DUEL BETWEEN F.D.R. AND THE SUPREME COURT (1967).
4 7
E. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. 64-79, 95- 115 (1941).
48 The phrase is Joseph Alsop's. J. ALSOP & T. CATLEDGE, supra note 46, at 135.
49 "The divine right of kings never ran a more prosperous course than did [the] unques-
tioned prerogative of tihe Constitution to receive universal homage." W. WILSON, CON-
GRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 4 (1885).5 0 E. ROSTOw, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE 23-44 (1962); W. RUMBLE, AMERICAN
LEGAL REALISM 214 passim (1968); Miller, Some Pervasive Myths about the United
States Supreme Court, 10 ST. Louis U.L.J. 153 (1965).
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"the Constitution is what the judges say it is," was more
careful in his phrasing in a book published in 1928, but he did
say there that since the Supreme Court's appellate power was
determined by Congress, a body representing the people, it
was the will of the people that sustained and made effective
the extraordinary power of the Court. He seemed to be say-
ing, indeed, that although Congress and the people were gov-
erned by decisions of the Court in matters of constitutional
interpretation, the will of the people in the long run deter-
mined what the Court said about the content of the Con-
stitution. The spread of such sentiments and the promotion of
more realistic understanding of the Constitution and of the
Court which defined its meaning may have incidentally jeop-
ardized the hitherto prevailing reverence for the Constitution
and for the Court as its interpreter. 51
The nineteenth century witnessed limited use of the formal
constitutional amendment process because (1) the Constitution
was held in high reverence, and (2) much of what needed changing
was accomplished by Court interpretation. On the other hand, the
twentieth century sees increased recourse to the formal amending
procedure because (1) realist perspectives have stripped the Con-
stitution of its aura of superiority, and (2) Court interpretations
either have failed to meet societal needs (as in the thirties), or
have served to create new or to aggravate existing social tensions.
Moving Congress to the point where two-thirds of the members
of each of the two houses52 will agree to propose an amendment
is, however, a task of no mean dimensions. The alternative article
V amendment prociess, getting thirty-four state legislatures to
agree to petition Congress to call a constitutional convention,
might appear to involve even greater difficulties, but experience
suggests otherwise. State legislatures rather notoriously spend
little time on amendments which they are called upon to ratify, 53
and studies of interest group activities indicate that resistance to
pressure and influence is considerably less pronounced at the
state level than it is at the national level.54 The convention pro-
cess of article V thus loomed increasingly attractive.
5 1 Swisher & Nelson, In Convention Assembled, 13 VILL. L. REV. 711, 715-16 (1968)
(footnotes omitted).
52 This does not mean that two-thirds of the total membership must vote approval. The
amendments of 1789 were submitted by two-thirds of the members present. The Supreme
Court specifically sustained this practice in The National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350,
386 (1920). See L. ORFIELD, supra note 23, at 49-50; Corwin & Ramsey, The Con-
stitutional Law of Constitutional Amendment, 26 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 185, 190-91
(1951).
13 See D. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 243-45 (1966) for two illustra-
tions.
14 H. ZEIGLER, INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY ch. 11 (1964).
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The language of article V55 leaves a number of questions
unanswered. A literal interpretation would lead to the conclusion
that whenever the number of applications received from the states
equaled two-thirds of the number of states then in the Union, the
condition of article V has been met and a convention should be
called. Conceivably, this situation may have occurred at some
time in the nineteenth century; a reliable count of state resolutions
requesting a convention is not available.56 The first concerted
effort to produce constitutional change through the article V con-
vention-amendment process occurred between 1901 and 1909,
when twenty-six states asked for an amendment to bring about the
popular election of United States Senators.5 7 Simultaneously, mo-
mentum gained for an amendment to make polygamy a federal
offense. Between 1906 and 1911, twelve states petitioned Con-
gress to call a convention to consider the proposed anti-polygamy
amendment. Eight of these states had also joined in the campaign
for the popular election of Senators.58 Since, at the time, the
critical number of states needed was thirty-one, the unduplicated
number of petitioning states was short by one, and the question of
sufficiency, despite disparity of subject, did not arise.
Almost as soon as the eighteenth amendment had become a
part of the Constitution, agitation began at the state level to seek
its repeal by the convention method. 59 Wayne B. Wheeler, the
General Counsel of the Anti-Saloon League of America, argued
that Congress had rejected the "mandatory" construction of ar-
ticle V, a construction which maintained that once two-thirds of
the states had asked for a convention, the role of Congress in
calling the convention was purely ministerial. Wheeler took the
position that there had been a sufficient number of state petitions
during a period in which no less than seven Congresses had been
sitting. Congress had been given seven opportunities to act and
55 Article V of the Constitution reads in part:
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the
Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents
and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures
of three-fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three-fourths
thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the
Congress....
U.S. CONST. art V.
56 L. ORFIELD, supra note 23, at 42. Senator Ervin counted 304 applications between
the years 1789 and 1971, but conceded that an accurate count was not possible. 117
CONe. REC. 36754 (1971).
57 L. ORFIELD, supra note 23, at 43; Wheeler, Is a Constitutional Convention Impend-
ing?, 21 ILL. L. REv. 782, 786-87 (1927).
58Wheeler, supra note 57. at 787-88.
9 Id. at 782, 788-89.
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had failed to do so. The conclusion Wheeler drew from this con-
gressional inaction was that there was no way to activate the
convention method without Congress wanting to do so.6°
The theory that congressional calling of a convention was a
ministerial function appeared to be supported by the weight of
authority at the time. W.W. Willoughby's magisterial treatise
noted that "the act thus required of Congress . . . is stated in
imperative form by the Constitution. " 61 A later writer asserts
unequivocally that "all writers on the subject are in agreement on
the point that, when a sufficient demand is made, it is mandatory
upon Congress to call a convention."
62
Wheeler, in his concern for the preservation of the eighteenth
amendment, was primarily interested in demonstrating why, in
spite of the imperative language of the Constitution, Congress
should not act. Frank Packard, a strong partisan of the proposed
constitutional limitation of the income tax rate, was concerned
with how Congress could be made to act. Noting that state courts
had issued writs of mandamus against legislative bodies 63 and that
the Supreme Court had mandamused the legislature of West Vir-
ginia,64 Packard concluded that mandamus would be available to
compel Congress to call a convention. Somewhat -naively, he
added that
[w]hether the writ would be obeyed, or whether the claim
might be advanced that one department of the federal govern-
ment is powerless to assert its authority over another and
co-ordinate branch of the same government, are questions
which could not be answered at this time and may, for that
matter, never arise. 5
In view of the fact that Coleman v. Miller66 had been decided
thirteen years earlier, Packard's position is difficult to justify. In
Coleman, four justices had urged that the amending process
60 Id. at 790, 802.
61 I W. WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 597 (1929).
Willoughby cited Justice Story's opinion in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.)
304, 328-33 (1816). as authority for the proposition that when the word "shall" is used in
the Constitution, a mandatory duty is imposed. Curiously enough, Willoughby ignored
Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (186 1), which held that "it shall be the duty"
was not a mandate or imperative, but only imposed a moral obligation.
62Packard, Legal Facets of the Income Tax Rate Limitation Program, 30 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 128, 134 (1952).
63 Id. at 135, citing State v. Town Council, 18 R.i: 258, 27 A. 599 (1893).
6Id. at 135, citing Virginia v. West Virginia, 246'U.S. 565 (1918). See also Heller. The
Supreme Court: Its Role in the Balance of the Federal System, 6 J. PUB. L. 319, 326-27
(1957).
6 Packard, supra note 62, at 137 (emphasis added). In the same vein is Dirksen, The
Supreme Court and the People, 66 'MICH. L. REV. 837. 871 (1968).
"307 U.S. 433 (1939).
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should not be "subject to judicial guidance, control or interference
at any point." 67 Three other members of the Court (including
Chief Justice Hughes) agreed that the key issue of "the efficacy of
ratification by state legislatures, in the light of previous rejection
or attempted withdrawal" should be treated as a "political ques-
tion," but they were not prepared to negate all judicial com-
petence to review the amending process. 68 By shying away from
the all-inclusive position taken by the concurring justices, Justices
Hughes, Stone, and Reed avoided the necessity of overturning the
precedent of Dillon v. Gloss,69 in which the Court had enter-
tained-and affirmatively answered-the question of Congress'
authority to set a seven-year limit on the time allowed to states to
ratify a proposed amendment.
Lester Orfield summarized the state of the law after Coleman:
If the Supreme Court is not ready to apply the doctrine of
political questions to all phases of the amending process, as
four members of the Court wish, it will apply it to some
phases of the amending process and what such phases are
remains largely uncertain.
70
Coleman v. Miller was decided thirty-four years ago. There has
been no decision 71 of the Supreme Court interpreting article V in
the years since, although five amendments have been added to the
Constitution (and a sixth one has been proposed by Congress and
is currently awaiting ratification by the requisite number of
states). The uncertainties bequeathed by Coleman are still with
us.
Indeed, given the lapse of time, it could be argued that Cole-
man itself is of doubtful value as a precedent. Of the justices who
participated in Coleman, only one-Justice Douglas-is still on
the Court. Justice Douglas was one of the four justices who would
have favored a complete "hands-off' position, contending that all
questions arising from the amending process belonged in the cate-
gory of "political questions."
In Baker v. Carr,72 Justice Brennan, writing for a six-member
majority of the Court, quoted Coleman's language that
[1]n determining whether a question falls within [the political
question] category, the appropriaieness under our system of
67 Id. at 459 (concurring opinion).6 1 Id. at 450.
69256 U.S. 368 (1921).
70 L. ORFIELD, supra note 23, at 36 (emphasis added).
71 Chandler v. Wise, 307 U.S. 474 (1939), while appearing in the reports after Coleman
v. Miller, was decided on the same day.
72369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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government of attributing finality to the action of the political
departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a
judicial determination are dominant considerations.
73
In the subsequent discussion of representative cases, Justice
Brennan carefully described the Coleman holding in the limited
terminology of Chief Justice Hughes. 7 4 Justice Douglas' con-
curring opinion explicitly avoided the discussion of the doctrine of
political questions, 75 while Justice Frankfurter, in dissent, quoted
the last part of the same sentence by Hughes that Brennan had
used.
76
Chester Antieau, in his treatise on constitutional law, asserts
that "whether amendments to the Federal Constitution have been
properly ratified is a political question." 77 In light of the carefully
limited description of the Coleman holding in the Baker opinion, it
would appear that Orfield 78 was more accurate in stressing the
remaining areas of uncertainty.
Past decisions, to be sure, have answered a number of ques-
tions relating to the amending process. 79 The Court has ruled that
the content of an amendment to the Constitution cannot be chal-
lenged and that an explicit finding of necessity is not required.8 0
Early in the nation's history presidential approval of a proposal
adopted by Congress was held not required by the language of
article V. 81 In Dillon v. Gloss, 2 the Court suggested that propos-
als, which had been pending so long as to be out-of-date, might
have lost their force and held that, by reasonable extension,
Congress could provide for a time limit for ratification.
The Court has further held that Congress has complete free-
dom of choice between the two modes of ratification provided by
article V;83 that if Congress elects ratification by legislatures, the
states may not substitute a popular referendum or make legislative
ratification subject to voter approval by referendum; 4 and that an
amendment becomes an operative part of the Constitution on the
73 Id. at 210.
74 Id. at 214.
71 Id. at 242-43 (Douglas. J.. concurring).
76 Id. at 283 (Frankfurter, J.. dissenting).
77 2 C. ANTIEAU, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 672 (1969). citing Coleman v. Miller.
307 U.S. 433 (1939).
78 See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
79 L. ORFIELDsupra note 23, at 8- 126. See also Corwin & Ramsey. supra note 52.
80 National Prohibition Cases. 253 U.S. 350 (1920).
81 Hollingsworth v. Virginia. 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 378 (1798).
82256 U.S. 368 (1921). All amendments proposed since that time have carried a
seven-year time limitation within which ratification must occur.
83 United States v. Sprague. 282 U.S. 716 (1931).
84 Leser v. Garnett. 258 U.S. 130 (1922): Hawke v. Smith. 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
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day on which a sufficient number of states have in fact ratified it,
rather than on the date of the proclamation of ratification by the
Secretary of State.
But a number of questions remain unanswered. Without pre-
tending to be exhaustive, these questions may be listed as follows:
1. May Congress on its own initiative call a convention to
amend or revise the Constitution?
2. If a convention is called, whether in response to state
petitions or not, is Congress at liberty to determine its com-
position and procedures?
3. If a convention is called, may Congress limit it to a
specific proposal or topic?
4. If Congress has transmitted a proposed amendment to
the states and the ratification process has not been completed,
may Congress withdraw the proposal?
5. If a state has acted to ratify a proposed amendment,
may it recall that action in favor of rejection?
6. If a state acts on ratification, must its action be in
accord with its own legislative procedures or may Congress
prescribe procedures for this purpose?86
The call for "a new Constitution" is heard with some regu-
larity, usually from academic quarters 7 These proposals rarely
have aroused much response. Yet the time may come when politi-
cal forces consider the time ripe for such a move. A restrictive
interpretation of article V might suggest that Congress must await
receipt of petitions from thirty-four states before it can call a
convention. The better view seems to be that of Corwin and
Ramsey:
[I~f we assume that the machinery which is prescribed in
Article V for amending the Constitution is a particular organ-
ization of the inherent power of the people of the United
States to determine their political institutions, then it would
seem that Congress' obligation to call a convention upon the
application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the States was
not thought to exhaust its power in this respect, but was
85Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 376 (1921). The role of the Secretary of State in the
amending process derives from an Act of Congress. Act of April 20, 1818, ch. 80, §4, 3
Stat. 439. It was transferred to the Administrator of General Services by I U.SC. § 106b
(1970) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 31, 1951, Pub. L. No. 248, § 106b, 65 Stat. 710).
86This list draws on Corwin & Ramsey, supra note 52, and Gilliam, Constitutional
Conventions. Precedents, Problems, and Proposals, 16 ST. Louis U.L.J. 46 (1971).87E.g., BALDWIN, REFRAMING THE CONSTITUTION (1972); W. ELLIOTT, THE NEED
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM (1935); W. MACDONALD, A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR A
NEW AMERICA (1921); R. TUGWELL, A MODEL FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR A
UNITED REPIBLIC OF AMERICA (1970).
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intended merely to specify a contingency in which it would be
under the moral necessity of exercising it. 8
If a convention embodies "the inherent power of the people of
the United States," may its powers be restricted? John Jameson,
whose treatise long served as the principal authority on con-
stitutional conventions, maintained that a convention could be
restricted to a limited mandate.8 9 Dodd and Hoar, writing two
generations later, took the view that a convention was bound by
the existing constitution but could not be limited by the legisla-
ture.90 The case against limitation was perhaps most clearly stated
by Gooch:
[N]o legal limitation can exist upon the legally defined meth-
od of amending a constitution. The proposition is well recog-
nized by serious students of jurisprudence. Denial of the
proposition involves a contradiction in terms. In civilized
states that are subject to law, the highest law is the con-
stitution. Legal power to amend the constitution is the highest
form of authority to make law. For any legal limitation on this
power to exist, the limitation would have to be contained in
and defined by a higher form of law. But since the Con-
stitution is the highest form of law, this is an impossibility. 91
Conceptually, this position would seem unassailable. In prac-
tice, however, the weight of decisions has been the other way.
92
The decisions are, however, those of state courts dealing with
state conventions in the light of state constitutions. The works of
Jameson, Dodd, and Hoar likewise all deal with conventions at
the state level. It is at least arguable that, because of the federal
aspects involved, a national convention differs sufficiently from
state conventions that state decisions need not necessarily con-
trol. Therefore, generalizations based on state decisions are not
necessarily applicable.
Senator Sam Ervin, who is the author of legislation intended to
implement the convention method,93 has stated that the argument
"8Corwin & Ramsey, supra note 52, at 196.
89 J. JAMESON, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS; THEIR HISTORY, POW-
ER, AND MODES OF PROCEEDINGS (4th ed. 1887).
90W. DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 73. 77-80
(1910); R. HOAR, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS91 (1917).
9'Gooch. The Recent Limited Constitutional Convention in Virginia, 31 VA. L. REV.
708,724 (1945), citing W. WILLOUGHBY, THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC LAW
103-04 (1924).
92 See e.g., Staples v. Gilmer, 183 Va. 338, 32 S.E.2d 129 (1944), Frantz v. Autry, 18
Okla. 561,91 P. 193 (1907).
93S. 215. 92d Cong.. Ist Sess. (1971): S. 623, 91st Cong.. Ist Sess. (1969); S. 2307.
90th Cong.. Ist Sess. (1967). These bills, virtually identical in content, would provide
procedures for calling a constitutional convention under article V. Sections two through
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against a limited convention "can be wrenched from Article
V-but only through a mechanical and literal reading of the words
of the Article, totally removed from the context of their promulga-
tion and history."94 The Senator's reading of the historical record
persuaded him that the framers "did not appear to anticipate the
need for a general revision of the Constitution" and that they
expected a "specific amendment or amendments rather than gen-
eral revision."
95
It is possible to quarrel with this reading of the record. Far
more compelling is the practical argument advanced by the Sena-
tor:
If the subject matter of amendments were to be left entirely
to the convention, it would be hard to expect the states to call
a convention in the absence of a general discontent with the
existing constitutional system. 96
Paul Kauper made the same point with perhaps even greater
poignancy:
[T]he usefulness of the alternative amendment procedure
as a means of dealing with a specific grievance on the part
of the states will be defeated if the states are told that it
can be invoked only at the price of subjecting the nation to
all the problems, expense, and risks involved in having a
wide open constitutional convention. 97
Thus the limiting language of the Ervin bill, 98 while it is not
compelled by legal logic, is clearly more in keeping with practical
considerations and political feasibility.
The Ervin bill supplies an equally realistic solution to the
question of whether a state may recall its ratifying action:
SEC. 13 (a) Any State may rescind its ratification of a
proposed amendment by the same processes by which it
five define procedures to be used by the states in making application to Congress for the
calling of a constitutional convention. Sections six through ten establish procedures for
congressional calling of a convention and regulate the convention's organization and
conduct. Section eleven provides that congressional approval of any amendment agreed
upon by the convention must occur within ninety days; sections twelve and thirteen deal
with the ratification process.
94 Ervin, Proposed Legislation to Implement the Convention method of Amending the
Constitution, 66 MicH. L. REV. 875, 881 (1968).
95 Id. at 882.
9 6 Id. at 883.97 Kauper, supra note 27, at 912.
9 The bill originally introduced by Senator Ervin read:
No convention called under this Act may propose any amendment or amend-
ments of a general nature different from that stated in the concurrent resolu-
tion calling the conventions.
S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10(b) (1967).See also Ervin, supra note 94, at 900.
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ratified the proposed amendment, except that no State may
rescind when there are existing valid ratifications of such
amendment by three-fourths of the States.
(b) Any State may ratify a proposed amendment even
though it previously may have rejected the same proposal. 99
Section 13(b) confirms prior practice and the specific ruling in
Coleman v. Miller.10 0 Section 13(a), on the other hand, breaks
new ground but addresses itself to a problem which, subsequent
to the drafting and introduction of the Ervin bill, appeared as a
concrete issue.101 Again it would appear that the solution is
founded less in consideration of the legal constraints than in the
perspective of the practicalities of the political process.
If the action of a state legislature on a proposed amendment to
the Constitution of the United States were viewed as an ordinary
legislative act, rescission of the amendment would be permissible,
essentially as if it were the repeal of a statute. But the established
view is that ratification is not a legislative function. When Con-
gress proposes an amendment, its power to do so derives from
article V; and when a state legislature acts on the proposal, it does
so by virtue of, and in accordance with, article V. 10 2 The legisla-
ture acts in a constituent capacity, not a legislative one. It could
be asserted that constitution-making, as distinguished from
law-making, is an event of unique impression and that the states
are called upon to engage in this function but once for each
proposal. The logic of this reasoning would, of course, require
rejection of the present rule that ratification following rejection is
a valid exercise of the state's role under article V.
Even without considering the practical aspects, this "one-
chance-only" approach stands on weak foundations. Con-
ceptually, one could argue that a constituent act is an exertion of
the will of the people at one time. However, article V precludes
this by dividing the constituent act into two phases, one of which
(the proposal) has to precede the other (the ratification). 03 Once
this separation is made, and given further the lack of coincidence
in time of state legislative sessions, it seems difficult to maintain
that the second phase of the constituent act cannot take place at
99S. 215, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. § 13 (1971). See also Ervin, supra note 94, at 902.
100 307 U.S. at 433. See note 66 and accompanying text supra.
101 In the spring of 1973, resolutions were introduced in the legislatures of several states
seeking rescission of a previous ratification action of the Equal Rights Amendment.
Nebraska's legislature acted to rescind. N.Y. Times. Mar. 16. 1973, § I. at I. col. 4: N.Y.
Times. Mar. 17. 1973. § I. at 13. col. 3.
102 Hawke v. Smith. 253 U.S. 221. 229 (1920); Opinion of the Justices. 118 Me. 544.
546-47. 107 A. 673, 674 (1919). See also L. ORFIELD, supra note 23. at 62-63.
103 See note 55 supra.
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any time within the period allowed by Congress. Within that
period, can the constituent will be required (or expected) to re-
main constant? The answer would seem to be that, if the con-
stituent will is sovereign, one can hardly forbid it to change.
Permeating the Ervin bill is the assumption, derived from the
concurring opinion in Coleman, that the amending process is
political and properly the exclusive province of Congress. Earlier
it was suggested that Coleman v. Miller might not be as strong a
precedent today as it seemed even two decades ago. 10 4 The Ervin
bill would make this question entirely academic, for it proposes to
withdraw the amending process from judicial review altogether.
10 5
As Paul Kauper observed,
whether Congress can insulate the questions as thoroughly
from judicial review as is proposed in the Ervin bill is not
clear, although as a practical matter it may be supposed that
the courts will accord Congress a wise discretion both in
interpreting the article V language and in administering the
legislation designed to implement it.'06
Since these words were written, the personnel of the Supreme
Court has undergone major change, with the newer members
displaying a marked tendency to defer to Congress. 10 7 The Ervin
bill's foreclosure of judicial review probably runs less risk of
judicial nullification today than it did five years ago.
Meanwhile, activity on the amendment front continues una-
bated. Applications for a convention to amend the Constitution
appear to have become the preferred mode of response by those
who dislike a given ruling by the Court.108 It must be expected
that, sooner or later, there will be a congruence of applications
compelling a congressional call for a convention. Hopefully, the
Ervin bill (or an equivalent) will have prepared for the event.
Once a convention has taken place and the feasibility of this
process has been demonstrated, it can be anticipated that the
device will be employed with increasing frequency. Formal
amendment will then assume new importance in the constitutional
scheme and in the political life of the nation. Presumably, a
104 See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
105 S. 2307, 90th Cong., ist Sess.§§ 3(b), 5(c), 10(b), 15(c) (1967).
106 Kauper, supra note 27, at 908.
107 Kauper. A Look at the Burger Court and a Look Back at the Warren Court, 17 LAW
QUADRANGLE NOTES (Univ. of Mich.) 6. 11 passim (1973).
08 In response to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973), twelve State legislatures petitioned Congress. within five months of the decisions.
for a convention to amend the Constitution by providing a definition of "person" to include
a fetus at any state of development after the moment of conception. POPULATION CRISIS,
July-Aug., 1973, at 1.
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concomitant consequence would be a decline in the importance of
informal amendment-and hence in the role of the Supreme
Court.
Whether this is or is not desirable is an issue of great dimen-
sions. Involved are such basic propositions as the ability of demo-
cratic government to be responsive to the public's needs and
wants, and the perennial question of the balance among the three
branches of a government based on a separation of powers. These
are issues that are quite clearly political to the highest degree.
Thus the essence of the American constitutional scheme is, as in
other nations, revealed as preeminently political. The change fore-
seen by the concurring justices in Coleman'09 may in fact be
imminent and appropriate.
109 See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
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